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Abstract
We model an interaction between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver. Like
the classic cheap talk setup, the informed player sends a message to an uninformed receiver
who is to take an action which a¤ects the payo¤s of both players. However, unlike the
classic cheap talk setup, the sender can communicate only through the use of discrete
messages. In particular, the sender has a nite set of message elements with which to
compose messages. The sender incurs a communication cost which is increasing in the
number of elements contained in the message. We characterize the resulting equilibria with
a permissive out-of-equilibrium restriction. We introduce a stronger out-of-equilibrium
requirement and show that if the sender and receiver have aligned preferences regarding
the action of the receiver then only the most informative equilibrium exists. When the
preferences between players are not aligned, we show that our stronger condition does
not guarantee uniqueness and we provide an example where an increase in communication
costs can improve communication. As we show in an example, this improvement can
occur to such an extent that an equilibrium can outperform the Goltsman et. al. (2009)
upper bound for payo¤s in mediated communication.
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1 Introduction
A person will often use words to convey information about a complex and nuanced reality.
Words are discrete objects in the sense that their properties are very di¤erent from that of real
numbers. Statements are then nite combinations of these discrete objects. Although there
is rarely a single word to convey the entire extent of the complex reality, the communicator
can approach this complexity by constructing more elaborate and complex statements.
In this paper, we take the view that communication is necessarily discrete. We analyze
the implications of such discrete communication in a strategic interaction between an informed
sender and an uninformed receiver. In our model, the sender learns the state of the world
on the unit interval and transmits a discrete message to the receiver. After observing the
message, the receiver is to take an action which a¤ects the payo¤s of both sender and receiver.
In our model, the sender can send either a costless, empty1 message (?) or a costly,
nonempty message which is constructed from a set of message elements fe1; :::; eg. We
assume that the cost of transmitting a message is an increasing function of the number of
elements in the message. For instance, the cost of transmitting the empty message is c(0)
and the cost of transmitting a message with three elements, say (e3; e5; e2), is c(3). In our
model, there is no syntax and the message elements have no a priori meaning. We view this
a relatively simple and general way to model discrete communication in which more elaborate
messages can be constructed but at a cost to the sender.
We characterize the resulting equilibria under a permissive out-of-equilibrium condition,
which we call Condition P . This condition roughly states that if a receiver ever observes an
out-of-equilibrium message then the receiver believes that the message was sent by the sender
with the least incentive to deviate. We characterize the equilibria under Condition P . Like
the original cheap talk paper of Crawford and Sobel (1982) (hereafter referred to as CS), this
condition implies many equilibria.
We introduce a stronger out-of-equilibrium restriction on beliefs, Condition L. This
restriction roughly states that if a receiver ever observes an out-of-equilibrium message then
the receiver believes that the message was sent by the sender with themost incentive to deviate.
We show that under Condition L, if there is perfect alignment between the preferences over the
receivers action and we restrict attention to pure strategies of the sender then the equilibria
is the one preferred by the receiver. This result is similar to that when the No Incentive to
Seperate (NITS) condition is applied to the original cheap talk model as in Chen, Kartik and
Sobel (2008).
Further, if preferences for the receivers action are not aligned, we show that Condition
L does not guarantee a unique equilibrium and we provide an example where an increase
in communication costs improves communication. Quite surprisingly, when preferences are
not aligned and the sender incurs communication costs there exists equilibrium in which the
1Throughout the paper we describe the costless message as empty rather than the condition of having not
received a message. This is because, in a practical setting, it might not be easy to distinguish between the
sender having decided to not send a message and the sender having not yet sent a message. To rule out this
confusion we describe the costless message as empty.
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receivers payo¤s outperform the Goltsman et. al. (2009) upper bound for payo¤s in such
communication games. We provide an example of such an equilibrium.
2 Related Literature
2.1 Cheap Talk and Related Models
The large strand of cheap talk literature was initiated by CS. The authors show that for mild
di¤erences in the preferences of receiver and sender, meaningful, albeit incomplete, commu-
nication can occur.2 CS shows that equilibrium always takes the form that the state space
is partitioned and the messages are sent such that a unique action is induced within each
element of the partition. Our equilibrium is analogous, in that a unique action is induced on
each interval.
A number of papers have extended the original CS model. For instance, Morgan and
Stocken (2003) extend the CS model to the case where there is uncertainty regarding the
degree of divergence between the preferences of the sender and receiver. Fischer and Stocken
(2001) model a situation where the receiver has imperfect information about the state. Blume,
Board and Kawamura (2007) modify the CS setup where communication errors (or noise) can
occur. In our view, the present paper shares the goal of these papers: to learn the signicance
of a particular assumption in the CS model. Here we seek to learn the importance of the
assumption that messages are plentiful and equally costless.
Blume, Board and Kawamura (2007) demonstrated that a small amount of noise can
improve communication in the CS model. In particular, the authors show that there is an
optimal amount of noise which maximizes the receivers payo¤s. Relatedly, Goltsman et.
al. (2009) study general communication in the CS model. The authors study mediation,
whereby a neutral third party or mediator will advise both of the players. Surprisingly,
Goltsman et. al. (2009) nd that the payo¤s in the equilibrium with the optimal amount of
noise found by Blume, Boad and Kawamura is the the upper bound of payo¤s for the receiver
in any mediated communication in the CS setting. We provide an example of an equilibrium
in which communication costs imply that the receiver can attain a payo¤ above this upper
bound.
The original CS model exhibits a large number of possible equilibria. Specically, CS
shows that for a given di¤erence in the preferences of the sender and receiver, if there is an
equilibrium where the state space is partitioned into a nite number of partitions (say n) then
there are equilibria which partition the state space into 1, 2,.. and n   1 elements. Our
out-of-equilibrium Condition P leads to a similar result in that, for a given set of parameter
values and an ordering of messages, there exists a message within the ordering which has a
maximum complexity (say i) which could which could constitute an equilibria. Additionally,
under Condition P there are equilibria where the complexity of this message could take all
available values between 1 and i  1.
2Spector (2000) shows that in the CS model, as the di¤erence between the preferences of sender and receiver
converge, the equilibrium converges towards full information transmition.
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As is often the case for multiple equilibria, researchers have sought to reduce the number of
cheap talk equilibria through renements.3 A recent innovation in this regard is the Condition
No Incentive to Seperate (NITS) of Chen, Kartik and Sobel (2008). NITS restricts attention
to equilibria in which it is not the case that the sender who receives the state s = 0 (with a
state space of [0; 1]) prefers to perfectly reveal the state. In their Proposition 3, the authors
show that if the monotonicity condition holds in the CS model (as it does in the commonly
used "uniform-quadratic" case) then NITS selects a unique equilibrium which is the most
informative, i.e. contains the largest possible number of partitions. Our Condition L is
similar to NITS in that if an out of equilibrium message is observed then the receiver believes
that the state is equal to zero. 4 And similar to NITS, Condition L for the case of aligned
preferences rules out each equilibrium except those in the most informative class. However,
we also provide an example that, when preferences are not aligned, Condition L does not
guarantee uniqueness.
2.2 Costly Communication
We are not the rst to introduce costly communication into the CS model. Austen-Smith and
Banks (2000) and Kartik (2007) model costly and costless messages in the original CS model.5
While the present paper shares the feature that communication is costly, we di¤er in that here
communication is discrete and increasingly costly in the elaborateness of the message.
In Dewatripont and Tirole (2005) the sender incurs costs of e¤ectively communicating
information and the receiver incurs costs in absorbing information. In Dewatripont and
Tirole, information is either understood or not.6 By contrast, the states in our model are
better characterized by the degree to which they are learned. Additionally, in Dewatripont
and Tirole the sender and receiver necessarily have di¤erent preferences over the action of the
receiver. By contrast, we examine both the cases where they are aligned and are unaligned.7
To our knowledge, there are two costly communication papers in which there are shades
of understanding. In Calvo-Armengol, de Marti and Prat (2009) the sender transmits a
necessarily noisy signal but can a¤ect its precision by a incurring larger communication cost.
In our view, this assumption is less appropriate when modeling complex communication as the
signal actually sent is not necessarily less complex than the senders most preferred signal. In
3For instance, see Banks and Sobel (1987), Cho and Kreps (1987), Farrell (1993), Kohlberg and Mertens
(1987), Matthews, Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1991).
4Note that the formal statement of NITS relates to the payo¤s of the receiver. Nevertheless, implicit in the
statement of NITS is that after observing an out-of-equilibrium message, the receiver believes with certainty
that the state is zero. We focus on the beliefs associated with the out-of-equilibrium message, therefore our
statement of Condition L species beliefs.
5The cost of these messages are unrelated to the unknown state of the world. See Spence (1973) for the
classic model of the case where the cost of transmitting a signal varies with the underlying state of the world.
Also see Gossner, Hernandez and Neyman (2006).
6See Austen-Smith (1994) for another costly communication paper in which information is either understood
or not.
7Also note that we are not the rst to model communication between a sender and receiver who have
identical preferences over the receivers action. For instance, Morris (2001) presents such a model in which,
due to reputation e¤ects, the sender might not truthfully reveal the state of the world. Also see Blume and
Board (2009), Che and Kartik (2009), Cremer, Garicano and Prat (2007) and Jager, Koch-Metzger and Riedel
(2009).
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Cremer, Garicano and Prat (2007) a xed number of partition elements are optimally arranged
in order to minimize communication problems between an informed sender and an uninformed
receiver who have identical preferences over the action of the receiver. Like Cremer et. al., we
nd that the equilibrium mapping from the state space to the message space is not uniform.
In Cremer et. al. this is due to the di¤erential likelihood of events and in our paper it is due
to the di¤erential cost of the available messages.
Our model makes the prediction that the sender will be silent over some states of the
world. Similarly, the discretionary-based disclosure literature8 nds the conditions under
which a manager would withhold information about the value of the rm. For instance,
Verrecchia (1983) shows that in the presence of disclosure costs, there are states for which the
manager will chose not to disclose information. We di¤er from this literature in the sense
that we consider the case where sender and receiver have identical preferences over the action
of the receiver. Therefore, to our knowledge we are the only paper which nds silence even
in the case of perfect alignment of preferences.
3 Model
A sender (S) and receiver (R) play a communication game in a single period. Payo¤s for
both players depend on the receivers action a, as well as the state of the world s. A state
is an element of the closed interval [0; 1]. The receivers action space is R. The receivers
utility from action a when the state is s is:
uR(a; s) =  (a  s)2:
The receiver has ex-ante beliefs that the state is uniformly distributed on [0; 1]. The
sender observes the state and can communicate some information about the state to R by
sending a message m where m 2 M. Each m is composed of message elements fe1; :::; eg
where   1. If we let fe1; :::; egk represent the set of all k-tuples of elements then we write
M = ? [([1k=1fe1; :::; egk). We interpret messagem as more complex thanm0 ifm has more
elements than m0. The cost of communication (c : N)R) is an increasing function of the
number of elements in the message.9 Further, if message mi contains i elements and message
mi+1 contains i + 1 elements then we require that c(i + 1)   c(i)   > 0. We also assume
that c(0) = 0. In a slight abuse of notation, we will refer to the case described above as c > 0,
the case where there is no communication costs as c = 0 and the case of both communication
costs and the absence of communication cost as c  0.10 The senders utility is:
uS(a;mi; s) =  (a  s  b)2   c(i)
where b  0.
The senders strategy is  : [0; 1] ! M and the receivers strategy is  :M ! R. Note
8See Verrecchia (2001) for a review of the discretionary-based disclosure literature.
9Also see Vartiainen (2009) for a similar notion of communication costs.
10Of course, since there is no outside option, adding any amount to the function c would not a¤ect our
results. We assume that c(0) = 0 in order to render meaningful our notation of c = 0 and c > 0.
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that we restrict attention to pure strategies for both sender and receiver.11 We seek an
equilibrium (; ) such that S chooses the optimal action, given accurate beliefs R chooses
the optimal action and Rs beliefs are derived from BayesRule wherever possible. We denote
Rs beliefs as (sjm).
Denition 1 For an equilibrium (; ) we require:
for each s 2 [0; 1], m= argmax
m0
uS((m0);m; s)
for each m 2M, (m) = argmax
a0
Z
uR(a0; s)(sjm)ds
and that Rs beliefs are derived from Ss strategy.
Before we proceed to the results, we briey discuss some of our modeling choices. The
state space is designed to be richer than the message space12 as the state space is uncountably
innite and there are only a nite number of messages which can be transmitted with a
nite cost. We believe that this captures an important aspect of reality: it is impossible to
completely communicate the complexity of the real world, one may only increase the precision
of communication by expending more costly e¤ort.
Also, we assumed that there is only a single empty message. This is because it would
seem to be the case that there is only one way to literally say nothing. However, if there
were a nite number of di¤erent ways to say nothing then the qualitative results which follow
would not be changed.
Perhaps a natural questions is, why not model communication which is necessarily noisy
where the sender incurs a communication cost which is decreasing in the variance of the pos-
sible messages. Within this possibility, there arise some features which we nd unappealing.
First, suppose that the sender would costlessly specify the preferred action of the receiver
and the preferred amount of communication costs to a third party who would then add the
appropriate amount of noise to the message. As Blume, Board and Kawamura (2007) showed,
communication is enhanced by at least a small amount of noise. It would seem to violate the
spirit of the model that, even if communication is costless, the sender would prefer to transmit
a message with noise. Further, this problem is not avoided if the noise is determined by the
amount of e¤ort expended by the sender. Therefore, we do not view this possibility as an
adequate substitute for our modeling choices.
As a second option, suppose that the sender would costlessly specify the upper and lower
bound of the possible states which is communicated to the receiver. We argue that it should
be viewed as less costly to send a message indicating that the state is in the interval, [0:2; 0:4]
than in the interval [0:2132735409; 0:4132735409], as the latter would take more time to specify.
11The restriction to pure strategies on the part of the receiver is without loss of generality. However, the
restriction on the part of the sender is not entirely without loss of generality. Lemma 9 and the related
discussion in the appendix claries the extent to which the restriction to pure strategies is without loss of
generality.
12This assumption also appears in Jager, Koch-Metzger and Riedel (2009) and Lipman (2006).
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This option seems to betray the principle that more elaborate messages should be more costly
to send. Further, we would have to assume that the receiver is unsophisticated. For instance,
if the sender wished to communicate the state, s = 0:315789215, the sender could send the
message leading to the possible interval [0:315789215; 1] and the sophisticated receiver would
know that the state is certain to be 0:315789215. To avoid these types of problems, we would
either have to model the receiver as unsophisticated or to model communication as we do here.
In our view, modeling complexity is best done with a minimal abstraction of the nature of the
complexity, otherwise it is all too easy to retain some features of a model where all messages
are plentiful and equally costly.
In both of the above options, the communication does not, in our view, resemble com-
munication via words. Most notably the resulting equilibrium would be a fully separating
equilibrium whereby each state would induce a unique action by the sender. By contrast,
the equilibrium in our model is a pooling equilibrium in that for generic parameter values,
several states induce identical actions by the sender. This seems to be more consistent with
our intuition regarding communication.
Finally, note that a possible set of message elements are the set of single digit integers: f0;
1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9g. Therefore, the sender has the means to truthfully disclose the exact
state. However, we will see that, not only will this will not happen in equilibrium, but there
are many states for which the sender transmits the empty message.
4 Preliminaries
Before we o¤er a characterization of the equilibria, we introduce some notation and provide a
necessary condition for the equilibria.
Although our equilibria share some of the familiar characteristics of the cheap talk litera-
ture, the additional results which emerge will require the exibility provided by the notation
which we now dene. Like the CS equilibria, messages are sent on connected, nonoverlapping
intervals.13 Therefore, we may characterize an equilibrium by a set of cuto¤ states where we
denote the number of messages used in equilibrium as n by listing the order of the messages
messages m1; :::; mn. The messages induce a set of cuto¤ states which we denote:
0 = s1  s2  :::  sh  :::  sn  1 = sn+1:
Equilibrium is such that Ss messages are sent as intervals on the state space:
mh = 
(s) for s 2 [sh; sh+1)
and R best responds in a straightforward manner:
(mh) = a(sh; sh+1) = argmax
a0
Z h+1
h
uR(a0; s)(sjm)ds (1)
13See the appendix for the proof of Lemma 7 which shows that the equilibrium strategy for S entails sending
a message for states which are conntected intervals and Lemma 8 which shows that the intervals are not partially
overlapping.
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where a(sh; sh+1) is the best response of R if the state is known to be between sh and sh+1.
Denition 1 implies the arbitrage equation, also standard in the cheap talk literature. This
expression characterizes the equilibrium set of cuto¤ states:
uS(a(sh; s);mh; s) = u
S(a(s; sh+2);mh+1; s) for h 2 f1; :::; n  1g: (2)
We dene h to be the mass of states such that mh = (s). Since the messages are sent
on an interval of the state space and the states are distributed uniformly, h = sh+1 sh when
mh = (s) for s 2 [sh; sh+1) and mh 6= (s) for s =2 [sh; sh+1).
While subscripts refer to the order of the messages, we use superscripts to denote the
complexity of the message. Therefore, we denote the empty message as m0, a message with
a single element as m1 and so on. Correspondingly, we dene jh to be the mass of states
associated with the hth message which has complexity j. An an equilibrium in which there
are n actions induced will require that:
1 + 2 + :::+ n = 1 where h  0 for every h 2 f1; :::; ng (3)
We now provide a necessary condition for an equilibrium. Lemma 1 describes the relative
the size of two adjacent intervals. Like the CS model, for b > 0 the interval size is increasing in
its location on the state space. In other words, for b > 0 and c = 0, the intervals representing
larger numbers on the state space are larger than intervals representing smaller numbers. The
lemma also shows that the size of the interval is decreasing in the cost of the signal transmitted
on that interval.
Lemma 1 For any equilibrium (; ) where b  0 and c  0 in which there are n actions
induced, it must be that:
jh+1
2    ih2 = 4b hjh+1 + ihi+ 4 [c(i)  c(j)] for h 2 f1; :::; n  1g: (4)
Intuitively, note that more costly signals are conserved. In particular, the cost of a signal
is negatively related to the size of the state space on which it is transmitted. Also note that
when b > 0 and c = 0, we are essentially in the CS model as expression (4) easily reduces to
expression (21) in CS. Therefore, when b > 0 and c = 0 the intuition behind the relationship
between the interval size and its location on the state space is identical to that in CS.
5 Equilibrium Characterization under Condition P
In this section we characterize the equilibrium using a permissive out-of-equilibrium speci-
cation of beliefs, Condition P . Condition P is permissive in that it admits a great deal of
equilibria. By assuming this condition, we can best glean insights from the model and high-
light the utility of Condition L. Upon observing an out-of-equilibrium message, Condition
P species that, among the states which are equal to the actions selected by the receiver,
the receiver believes that it is the state which induces the message associated with the lowest
communication cost.
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Condition P : Given (; ), if there does not exist an bs such that (bs) = bm and R observesbm then R believes that the state is certain to be, among the states such that ((s0)) = s0,
the s0 where c((s0)) is the smallest. If there are several such s0 then the sender believes that
the state is the smallest of these.
In the introduction it was said that if the receiver observes an out-of-equilibrium message
then Condition P roughly species that the receiver believes that the state is such that the
sender had the least incentive to deviate. Now we can better qualify that statement. The
closer the alignment of preferences (smaller b) the smaller the di¤erence between the action
of the receiver and the senders most preferred action. Therefore, the closer the alignment of
preferences, the more accurately we can say that if the receiver observes an out-of-equilibrium
message then Condition P species that the receiver believes that the state is such that the
sender had the least incentive to deviate.
Note that Condition P implies that no new actions are induced by an out-of-equilibrium
message. This fact accounts for the permissive nature of Condition P : it is relatively di¢ cult
to locate a deviation from a potential equilibrium. Also note that the second statement in
Condition P applies only to the case where there are several states in which the payo¤s to
the sender are the highest. In this event, the statement ensures that there are well dened
beliefs after observing an out-of-equilibrium message. The results of the paper would not be
a¤ected if we selected another tie-breaking rule.
We now characterize the equilibria under Condition P . Our rst result is that under
Condition P the empty message will always be used in equilibrium. Further, for any positive
communication costs there will always exist an uninformative equilibrium where the empty
message is sent on all states.
Lemma 2 For any equilibrium (; ) under Condition P , there will exist a state s such
that (s) = m0. Also for any b  0 and c > 0, under Condition P there will exist an
equilibrium (; ) such that (s) = m0 for all s 2 [0; 1].
Proof: Consider (; ) in which the empty message is not used. Upon observing an
out-of-equilibrium message, suppose that Condition P species that the receiver will believe
that the state is s0. Therefore, a protable deviation for S is to send the empty message for
s0 rather than a costly message. Hence, in any equilibrium under Condition P the empty
message must be used. Now consider (; ) such that (s) = m0 for all s 2 [0; 1]. All
costly messages would not induce a di¤erent action from the receiver and yet the sender would
incur a cost of communication. Therefore, under Condition P there is no protable deviation
from this completely uninformative equilibrium.
Lemma 2 states that the empty message will always be used in any equilibrium which
satises Condition P , however, we will see a stronger analogous result for Condition L. In
particular we show that under Conditon L, there cannot be an equilibrium in which there
are unused, cheaper messages. Lemma 2 also states that for any communication costs, under
Condition P there will always exist an equilibrium which is completely uninformative. Again,
we will see how this changes under Condition L. We will show that if b = 0, the only time
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that there can be an uninformative equilibrium under Condition L is when there does not
exist an equilibrium under Condition L involving any costly messages.
Next, we o¤er a denition which summarizes the necessary conditions for an equilibrium
under Condition P .
Denition 2 A (; ) is P -feasible if there exists a state s such that (s) = m0 and satises
expressions (1), (3) and (4).
We now demonstrate a procedure for determining the range of (; ) which are P -feasible.
As such, consider a candidate message mh. We will show that for a general ordering of
messages to the left of and to the right of this candidate message, there is always a largest
candidate message such that all such candidates messages with lower costs are P -feasible and
all messages with higher costs are not P -feasible.
Consider an ordered h  1 tuple of messages (m1; :::;mh 1) where h  1, which we denote
as mL. These are the messages which are sent on states which are lower than (or to the left
of) our candidate message mh. Also consider an ordered n  h  1 tuple of messages, where
n h  1. In a slight abuse of notation, this tuple can be written as (mh+1; :::;mn) which we
denote as mR. These are the messages which are sent on states that are higher than (or to the
right of) the candidate message mh. Now consider the aggregation of these messages in an
ordered tuple (mL;mkh;mR). We will vary composition of the candidate message m
k
h among
the the messages which are available. The messages inM but not used by mL and mR can
be used in mkh. We increase k, among these remaining messages until the tuple (mL;m
k
h;mR)
is no longer P -feasible.
The setup described above can accommodate the case where mh is the rst (last) message
in the conguration. This is accomplished by an empty14 mL (mR). Also, it can be either
that mL or mR contains the empty message m0. However, it cannot be that both contain
the empty message because there is only a single such message in M. Finally, we say that
(mL;m
k
h;mR) is maximal and P -feasible if (mL;m
k0
h ;mR) where k
0 > k is not P -feasible. The
following lemma shows that for any mL and mR there is always a maximal and P -feasible
ordered tuple of messages forming (; ).
Lemma 3 For any c > 0 and P -feasible conguration of messages (mL;mR) forming (; )
there exists a there exists a maximal, P -feasible conguration (mL;mkh;mR) forming (; ).
Note that according to Lemma 3, the k such that (mL;mkh;mR) which is found to be
maximal and P -feasible depends on mL and mR. Therefore, checking the set of P -feasible
(; ) can be rather tedious because it must be accomplished for each feasible (mL;mR).
We are ready to characterize the equilibria under Condition P . We now show that each
P -feasible (; ) will form an equilibrium under Contidion P .
Proposition 1 If (; ) is P -feasible then it is an equilibrium under Condition P .
14Empty as in not containing a message rather than containing the costless, empty message m0.
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As the above proposition suggests, there are many equilibria under Condition P . This
abundance of equilibria stands in contrast to our results in the following section. There we
show that for b = 0, the only equilibria which satises Condition L are, among those which
satisfy Condition P , the equilibria which are most informative.
6 Alignment of Preferences under Condition L
Here we focus on the implications of Condition L for case where the preferences regarding the
receivers actions are perfectly aligned (b = 0). In the sequel we analyze the implications of
Condition L on the case where there is imperfect alignment of preferences (b > 0). In this
section, we ultimately show that only the most informative equilibrium exists under Condition
L.
We begin this section by noting that when b = 0, the order of the signals does not matter.
We can rewrite expression (4) in Lemma 1 for the case of b = 0 as:
(j)2   (i)2 = 4 [c(i)  c(j)] : (5)
As expression (5) suggests, the interval size on which a message is sent is determined only
by its communication cost and not by its placement in the state space. In other words,
when b = 0 the order of the messages does not matter. As a result, expression (5) does
not contain subscripts. This simplication somewhat mitigates the di¢ culty in identifying
equilibria which satisfy Condition P . However, the task is still di¢ cult because Condition
P only implies that the empty message is used, all other combinations of signals which are
P -feasible are not ruled out. Now we show that Condition L greatly reduces the di¢ culty in
identifying equilibria because only a unique class of (; ) can form an equilibrium.
If the incentives are aligned (b = 0) and there are n actions induced in equilibrium then
there are n + 1 states in which the sender has the most incentive to deviate.15 Therefore,
as a matter of convention, we select one of these n + 1 states. Hence, Condition L species
that if an out-of-equilibrium message is observed then R believes that the state is certain to
be s = 0.
Condition L: Given (; ), if there does not exist an bs such that (bs) = bm and R
observes bm then R believes that the state is certain to be s = 0.
The introduction stated that Condition L specied that if the receiver ever observes an
out-of-equilibrium message then the receiver believes that the message was sent by the sender
with the most incentive to deviate. Now we can better qualify that statement. The closer
the alignment of preferences (smaller b), the more accurately we can say that if the receiver
observes an out-of-equilibrium message then the receiver believes that the message was sent
by the sender with the most incentive to deviate. Before the statement of Condition L, we
noted that if b = 0 and there are n actions induced in equilibrium then there are n+ 1 states
15See Lemma 10 in the appendix.
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in which the sender has the most incentive to deviate. All of the results involving b = 0 would
follow if we selected any of the other such n states.16
Condition L is similar to NITS in the sense that the former species beliefs in the event of
an out-of-equilibrium message which are implicit in the statement of the latter. Additionally,
for the case that b > 0, s = 0 is typically not the state with the lowest equilibrium payo¤s
for the sender. For this reason we view Condition L in the case of b = 0 to be at least as
reasonable as NITS in the case of b > 0.
Before we state the main result regarding the equilibria under Condition L, we provide the
following lemmas which are used in the proof of the result. The rst lemma which we present
shows that there cannot exist holes in the equilibrium. Specically, it must be the case that
if a message of a certain cost is used in equilibrium, it must be the case that all messages of
equal cost or less are used in equilibrium.
Lemma 4 Consider mi which is transmitted with cost c(i). Under Condition L, if b = 0
and mi is used in equilibrium then every mj where c(j)  c(i) is also used in equilibrium.
Proof: Suppose that there is an equilibrium (; ) such that (s) = mi with cost c(i)
however there does not exists an s0 such that (s0) = mj and c(j)  c(i). If the signal mj is
observed, R believes that the state is certain to be s = 0. On the interval in the state space
for which the S sends message mi, Ss payo¤ cannot be higher than  c(i). By Lemma 10,
S has identical payo¤s at each of the states for which expression (4) is satised, including the
states 0 and 1. Therefore, at s = 0, the sender has a payo¤ of less than  c(i) and a protable
deviation is then to send mj . Therefore, (; ) cannot constitute an equilibrium.
We compare Lemma 2 with Lemma 4. According to Lemma 2, Condition P implies
that we are only guaranteed that the empty message will be used in every equilibrium. By
contrast, Lemma 4 shows that each equilibrium under Condition L implies that if a message
of complexity k is used in equilibrium then all other messages of complexity k or less will also
be used in equilibrium. An implication of this is that for b = 0 we can denote an equilibrium
by the most complex message used. Therefore, if the most complex equilibrium messages
have k elements then the number of costly equilibrium messages (n) is:
n =
kX
j=1
j
Since we can denote an equilibrium by its most costly message used in equilibrium, if this
message has a cost of c(k) then we will refer to the equilibrium as a k-equilibrium.
Denition 3 A k-equilibrium is one in which all messages which cost less than or equal to
c(k) are used.
16There can be problems if an out-of-equilibrium message leads to beliefs other than s = 0. For instance,
when b > 0 there are parameter values such that we are not guaranteed existence if an out-of-equilibrium
message implies beliefs of s = 1.
12
We now show that we are guaranteed a k-equilibrium such that there does not exist a
k0-equilibrium for k0 > k. If such a k is found then we say that the k-equilibrium is maximal.
We now show that we are guaranteed a maximal equilibrium.
If a k-equilibrium is to exist then, given costs c(0), c(1),..., c(k   1), c(k) it must be that
expressions (1), (3) and (4) are satised. Also, for an equilibrium to exist under Condition
P it must be that there are no holes.
Denition 4 A (; ) is L-feasible if it satises expressions (1), (3), (4) and additionally
there does not exist an unused message mk and a used message mk
0
such that k  k0.
We now show that if preferences are aligned then for any amount of communication costs
there is an L-feasible (; ) which is maximal.
Lemma 5 If b = 0 then for any c > 0 there is always exists a maximal, L-feasible (; ).
Proof: To check whether a (; ) is L-feasible we rewrite expressions (3) and (4). There
are k messages which cost c(k) and are sent on an interval of size k. There are k 1 messages
which cost c(k   1) and are sent on an interval of size k 1 =
q
4 [c(k)  c(k   1)] + (k)2.
There are k 2 messages which cost c(k   2) and are sent on an interval of size k 2 =q
4 [c(k)  c(k   2)] + (k)2. There are 2 messages which cost c(2) and are sent on a interval
of 2 =
q
4 [c(k)  c(2)] + (k)2. There are  messages which cost c(1) and are sent on an
interval of size 1 =
q
4 [c(k)  c(1)] + (k)2. Finally for the costless message, we write
0 =
q
4c(k) + (k)2. Therefore, we may write expression (3) asq
4c(k) + (k)2 + 
q
4 [c(k)  c(1)] + (k)2 + 2
q
4 [c(k)  c(2)] + (k)2+ (6)
:::+ k 2
q
4 [c(k)  c(k   2)] + (k)2 + k 1
q
4 [c(k)  c(k   1)] + (k)2 + kk = 1:
When communication costs increase, k must decrease to zero in order for expression (6) to
hold. Recall that we required that c(i+1)  c(i)   > 0 for all i 2 f0; :::; kg. Therefore, we
can write the lower bound of each term in the left hand side of expression (6):
p
4k + 
p
4(k   1) + 2
p
4(k   2) + :::+ k 2
p
4(2) + k 1
p
4 > 1. (7)
For every  and  , there is a k large enough so that expression (7) is satised. Therefore, we
are guaranteed a maximal, L-feasible (; ).
Intuitively, Lemma 5 shows that, for any communication costs there exists an upper bound
on the number of messages used in an equilibrium. It should not come as a surprise that full
communication is not attained when c > 0. However, the straightforward characterization
of equilibrium under Condition L is perhaps surprising, given the complicated nature of the
equilibrium under Condition P .
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We are now ready for the main result of the section. Proposition 2 shows that an equilibria
under Condition L always exists. Further, the only equilibria under Condition L are the ones
in which are maximal among the strategies which which satisfy the necessary conditions.
Proposition 2 If b = 0 then under Condition L an equilibrium (; ) always exists and it
is exclusively a member of the maximal, L-feasible class.
Proposition 2 shows that under Condition L, only the equilibria with the largest possible
number equilibrium messages does not have a protable deviation. The proposition uses the
language class because when b = 0, the ordering of the set of messages does not matter. Also,
one can see the full force of Condition L by noting the di¤erence between the multiplicity of
equilibria in Propositon 1 and the uniqueness found in Proposition 2
As stated earlier, our restriction to pure strategies on the part of the sender is not without
loss of generality. This is due to the fact that the proof of Proposition 2 crucially depends
on this restriction. To see this, consider a maximal, L-feasible (; ) for which there are
states on which S mixes between say two messages. In this case, Condition L does not o¤er
a protable deviation and therefore we are not guaranteed a maximal equilibrium.
Our Proposition 2 is reminiscent of Proposition 3 in Chen, Kartik and Sobel (2008). The
authors show that in the CS model where monotonicity holds, NITS admits only the most
informative equilibrium. In the notation of our model, Chen, Kartik and Sobel show that
for b > 0 and c = 0 in the uniform-quadratic case, NITS uniquely selects the most informa-
tive equilibrium. Our Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 of Chen, Kartik and Sobel becomes
more surprising when we provide an example which demonstrates that we are not guaranteed
uniqueness when b > 0 and c > 0.
6.1 Simple Characterization
Here we focus on the case where preferences are perfectly aligned (b = 0) and communication
costs are linear in the complexity of the message. For instance, this will allow us to discuss the
outcomes if the message space is ? [ ([1k=1f0; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9gk). Suppose that b = 0
and c (k) = ck. One might be tempted to conclude that an equilibrium of the following form
might exist, (s) = d for d 2 f0; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9g if s 2 [0:1d; 0:1(d+1)). However, even
under the permissive Condition P , Lemma 2 shows that this cannot be an equilibrium because
the empty message is not used. Further, if c = 0:1 then the equilibrium under Condition L
is such that 0 = 0:633 and 1 = 0:0366.
Another benet of this exercise is that, for general communication costs, it is di¢ cult to
characterize the threshold level of costs which render a (; ) L-feasible. However in the
linear case, the characterization is rather simple. If c(k)  c(k) then a (; ) associated with
a k-equilibrium is L-feasible and if c(k) > c(k) then such a (; ) is not L-feasible.
Lemma 6 If c(k) = ck and c > 0 then the cuto¤ cost for a k-equilibrium is:
c(k) =
 
1
2
Pk
j=1 
k jpj
!2
:
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Proof: At the largest c such that signal k is L-feasible, it must be that
 
k
2
= 0. By
expression (5) it must be that,
 
k 1
2
= 4c,
 
k 2
2
= 8c, ...,
 
1
2
= 4(k 1)c,  02 = 4kc.
Therefore, we may write expression (6) in the case of linear costs as
2
p
c(k) + 2
p
c(k   1) + 22
p
c(k   2) + :::+ 2k 2
p
c(2) + 2k 1
p
c(1) = 1:
and so the lemma is proved.
In order to provide some intuition for the characterization to this point, we provide the fol-
lowing example. Given linear communication costs, the example illustrates that the equilibria
under Condition P possesses a large amount of multiplicity however Condition L leaves only
the most informative class of equilibria. The example also illustrates the utility of Lemma 6.
Example 1 Consider the case where c(i) = 0:01i, b = 0 and  = 1. Note that:
c(4) = 0:00662 < 0:01 < c(3) = 0:0145.
Therefore, under Condition P there are four classes of k-equilibria17 where k 2 f0; 1; 2; 3g.
Any (; ) associated with a k0-equilibria such that k0  4 is neither P -feasible nor L-feasible.
For the k = 0 equilibrium, m0 gets sent on all states. For the k = 1 case, there are two
equilibria. There is an equilibrium where m0 is sent on states [0; 0:52) and m1 on states
[0:52; 1]. There is another equilibrium where m1 is sent on states [0; 0:48) and m0 on states
[0:48; 1]. Note that in each of the k = 1 equilibria 0 = 0:52 and 1 = 0:48. For the
k = 2 case, there are six equilibria. There is a monotonic equilibria where m0 is sent on
states [0; 0:392), m1 on states [0:392; 0:729) and m2 on [0:729; 1]. The remaining 5 equilibria
require that 0 = 0:392, 1 = 0:337, and 2 = 0:271. For the k = 3 case, there are 24
equilibria. There is a monotonic equilibria where m0 is sent on states [0; 0:363), m1 on states
[0:363; 0:665), m2 on [0:665; 0:892) and m3 on [0:892; 1]. The remaining 23 equilibria require
that 0 = 0:363, 1 = 0:302, 2 = 0:227 and 3 = 0:108. For Condition L, only the 24, k = 3
equilibria exist.
7 Imperfect Alignement of Preferences under Condition L
Recall Proposition 2 which demonstrated that the only equilibria under Condition L are the
ones which are maximal and L-feasible. Similarly, Proposition 3 in Chen, Kartik and Sobel
(2008) shows that in the CS model where monotonicity holds, NITS admits only the most
informative equilibrium. In the notation of our model, Chen, Kartik and Sobel show that
for b > 0 and c = 0 in the uniform-quadratic case that NITS uniquely selects the most
informative equilibrium.
For the case of b = 0 and c > 0, the order of the messages did not matter as long as
their size was governed by expression (5). For the case of b > 0 and c = 0, the order of the
17This example is not exhaustive, in that there are also many equilibria under Condition P which are not
k-equilibria. For instance, there is an equilibrium where m0 and mi are transmitted, where i 2 f1; :::; 24g.
There is another equilibrium where m0, m1 and mj are transmitted, where j 2 f2; :::; 15g.
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signals themselves did matter; what did matter was that the intervals on which each message
was sent were increasing. However, when b > 0 and c > 0 there is an interaction between
these two e¤ects, which might cause the nonuniqueness which we now describe. Note that
this nonuniqueness can manifest itself in two distinct ways. First, there could exist several
equilibria with a given set of equilibrium messages, however these equilibria di¤er in their
informativeness. Second, there can exist equilibria which satisfy Condition L yet di¤er in the
set of equilibrium messages. The following example demonstrates this second aspect and the
subsequent example demonstrates the rst.
Example 2 Suppose that b = 0:245,  = 1 and communication costs are c(i) = 0:01i. First,
there exists an equilibrium (; ) where two messages are used. Message m0 is sent on
s 2 [0; 0:03) and the m1 is sent on s 2 [0:03; 1]. The senders s = 0 equilibrium payo¤s
are  (0:015  0:245)2 =  0:0529, which is greater than deviation payo¤s of  (0:245)2   0:02
=  0:080. There also exists an equilibrium where m0 is sent for all states. The senders
s = 0 equilibrium payo¤s are  (0:5 0:245)2 =  0:065, which is greater than deviation payo¤s
of  (0:245)2   0:01 =  0:070.
This example stands in contrast to Chen, Kartik and Sobel (2008) who nd that NITS
uniquely selects only the most informative equilibrium when b > 0 and c = 0: This example
also stands in contrast to our Proposition 2 in that Condition L uniquely selects only the most
informative equilibria when b = 0 and c > 0.
Finally, as we show in the following example, when b > 0 there exists equilibria where an
increase in communication costs will improve communication.
Example 3 First, consider the costless communication case. When b = 0:2,  = 1 and
c(i) = 0, there is only one outcome equivalent equilibria of the following form: a single action
is induced on s 2 [0; 0:1) and a single action is induced on s 2 [0:1; 1]. Message m0 induces
a = 0:05 and message m1 induces a = 0:55. In this case, E[ (a  s)2] =  0:0608. However,
when b = 0:2,  = 1 and c(i) = 0:01i, there are two non-outcome equivalent equilibria. In the
rst equilibria, m0 is sent on s 2 [0; 0:12) and m1 on s 2 [0:12; 1]. In the second equilibria, m1
is sent on s 2 [0; 0:08) and m0 on s 2 [0:08; 1]. In the rst equilibria, E[ (a s)2] =  0:0569
and in the second, E[ (a   s)2] =  0:0649. If the cost of communication is increased to
c(i) = 0:02i then in the rst equilibria m0 is sent on s 2 [0; 0:14) and m1 on s 2 [0:14; 1],
implying E[ (a  s)2] =  0:0532. By way of comparison note that the equilibrium in which
there is no communication implies E[ (a  s)2] =  0:0833.
The above provides an example where an increase in communication costs can lead to an
improvement in communication. Also note that Example 3 contained an instance of two dis-
tinct equilibria, which share the set of equilibrium messages yet di¤er in their informativeness.
Finally, note that the last equilibrium described in Example 3 outperforms the upper bound
for payo¤s as found by Goltsman et. al. (2009).18 These authors nd that the upper bound
for the expected payo¤s of the receiver in mediated communication is:
E[ (a  s)2] =  1
3
b(1  b) =  0:0533:
18This possibility was rst suggested by Andreas Blume.
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What is the intuition behind the equilbrium which outperforms the Goltsman et. al. (2009)
upper bound? Note that there are two e¤ects at work. When b > 0, the sender increases
the intervals at the upper end of the state space, which reduces the expected payo¤ to the
receiver. However, the communication costs induce the sender to decrease the interval sizes
on which the costly signal is sent. In the relevant equilibrium, the costly message is in the
upper end of the state space. Therefore, these e¤ects work in opposite directions, thereby
achieving an expected payo¤ above that of the upper bound for the case where communication
is not costly.
8 Conclusions
We have modeled an interaction between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver
where communication is costly and discrete. We have characterized the equilibria under a
permissive out-of-equilibrium restriction, Condition P . When sender and receiver have aligned
preferences over the action of the receiver, we have demonstrated that under Condition L only
the most informative class of equilibria exists. This result is analogous to the application of
the No Incentive to Seperate (NITS) condition to the uniform-quadric version of Crawford
and Sobel (1982). Finally, for the case that preferences are not aligned, we have provided
an example where Condition L does not identify a unique equilibrium and that an increase
in communication costs might improve communication. Further, this improvement can be
large enough so that it outperforms the Goltsman et. al. (2009) upper bound on costless
communication.
There remain interesting questions which are unanswered. Also, we have modeled the
interaction as a single repetition. However, we are interested to learn the equilibrium behavior
where the interaction is repeated. There are three possibilities as the relationship is potentially
nitely repeated, innitely repeated or is repeated until the communication attains some
threshold. An additional issue which arises only in the repeated version of the game relates to
learning on the part of the receiver. Presumably there is a relationship between some publicly
observable signal and the optimal action for the receiver and also that the sender wishes to
teach the receiver this relationship. Additionally, we are eager to learn the signicance of our
assumption of quadratic preferences and a uniform probability distribution. Finally, we are
interested to know whether an environment with several heterogenous senders and receivers,
would produce a novel matching problem.
We are currently working on a version of our model where the sender imperfectly observes
the state. Our preliminary results, consistent with Blume, Board and Kawamura (2007),
suggest that a small amount of this noise can improve communication.
Finally, we are eager to test our theoretical results in an experimental setting. Like most
communication games, our equilibrium is quite complicated and this fact makes experimental
investigation di¢ cult. On the other hand, experimental papers have found suitable simpli-
cations of the theoretical communication papers which they test.19
19For instance, Cai and Wang (2006) and Kawagoe and Takizawa (2009). Also see Blume et. al. (1998)
and Blume et. al. (2001).
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9 Appendix
The appendix is organized as follows. First we prove a few results about the nature of the
equilibria. Then we prove the results which appear in the body of the paper. Lemma 7
now shows that the intervals must be connected. Lemma 8 shows that the intervals cannot
partially overlap. Then, we prove Lemma 1. We prove these results for the case of mixed
strategies. We will denote such possibly mixed strategies as e : [0; 1]! M.
Lemma 7 In any equilibria it cannot be the case that m 2 e(s) = e(s), m0 =2 e(s) = e(s),
m0 2 e(s0) and m =2 e(s0) where s < s0 < s.
Proof : Suppose there exists m such that (e) 1 (m) = (s1; s2) [ (s3; s4) with (s1; s2) \
(s3; s4) = ; and (e) 1 (m0) = (s2; s3).
If a(m) = a(m0) and c(m) 6= c(m0) then there exists a protable deviation for S in choosing
the cheaper message. If a(m) = a(m0) and c(m) = c(m0) then m0 2 e(s) = e(s) and
m 2 e(s0):
Now suppose that a(m) 6= a(m0). If a(m) < a(m0) and m0 2 e(s) for s 2 (s2; s3) as
 (a(m)  s  b)2   c(m) <  (a(m0)  s  b)2   c(m0) for s 2 (s2; s3)
then m0 2 e(s) for s 2 (s3; s4) as
 (a(m)  s  b)2   c(m) <  (a(m0)  s  b)2   c(m0) for s 2 (s3; s4):
If a(m) < a(m0) and m 2 e(s) for s 2 (s3; s4) as
 (a(m)  s  b)2   c(m) >  (a(m0)  s  b)2   c(m0) for s 2 (s3; s4)
then m 2 e(s) for s 2 (s2; s3) as
 (a(m)  s  b)2   c(m) >  (a(m0)  s  b)2   c(m0) for s 2 (s2; s3):
The proof for the case of a(m) > a(m0) follows in the analogous manner.
Lemma 8 In any equilibria it cannot be the case that m0 2 e(s0) where s0 2 [s1; s3) and
m00 2 e(s00) where s00 = [s2; s4) where s2 < s3.
Proof : Suppose that there was such an equilibrium. The message m0 induces action a0
and message m00 induced action a00. Therefore the payo¤ from sending m0 is
UR(m0) =  (a0   s  b)2   c(m0)
and the payo¤ from sending message m00 is
UR(m00) =  (a00   s  b)2   c(m0):
For a0 6= a00 there is only a single state for which
UR(m0) = UR(m00)
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and therefore this cannot be the case. For a0 = a00 because s2 < s1 < s3 < s4 and c(m0) <
c(m00) then there exists a protable deviation by the sender to select the cheaper message.
Therefore there cannot exist such an equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 1: If there are n + 1 distinct actions induced by the sender then it
must be that there are n equations in expression (2). If this was not the case then Denition
1 would not hold. A typical such expression would be the cuto¤ state between intervals such
that mih 2 e(s0) for s0 2 [sh; sh+1), mjh+1 2 e(s00) for s00 2 [sh+1; sh+2):
 

sh + sh+1
2
  sh+1   b
2
  c(i) =  

sh+1 + sh+2
2
  sh+1   b
2
  c(j):
Which we rewrite as:
 

sh   sh+1
2
  b
2
  c(i) =  

sh+2   sh+1
2
  b
2
  c(j)
 
 ih
2
  b
2
=  
 
jh+1
2
  b
!2
+ c(i)  c(j)
so that
(jh+1)
2   (ih)2 = 4 [c(i)  c(j)] + 4b

ih + 
j
h+1

:

Lemma 7 showed that the intervals must be connected. Lemma 8 showed that the equi-
libria cannot be partially overlapping. Either it is the case that the intervals have no states in
common or the intervals completely overlap. Lemma 1 showed the relative size of the intervals
as a function of their position on the state space and the cost of message. In the case that
the intervals completely overlap, it must be that the communication cost of each message is
identical, otherwise Lemma 1 would be violated. Note that we proved the above three lemmas
for the case of mixed strategies, however the same results would hold if we restricted attention
to pure strategies. In fact, as the next lemma shows, restricting attention to pure strategies
under Condition P can be done without loss of generality.
Lemma 9 Any distribution of outcomes in an equilibrium (e; ) with mixed strategies
under Condition P can be replicated with an equilibrium (0; 0) with pure strategies under
Condition P .
Proof: Consider an equilibrium with mixed strategies (e; ) and an equilibrium without
mixed strategies (0; 0) which generate identical outcomes. For the intervals on which the
sender mixes, it must be that the messages have identical communication costs. Therefore,
0 is such that only one of those messages is used whereas the others are not. Further,
under Condition P those unused messages cannot constitute a protable deviation for the
sender because the action induced by the message would not be preferred to that attained in
(0; 0).
Note that the proof of Lemma 9 crucially depends on Condition P . It is not the case that
the restriction to pure strategies under Condition L is without loss of generality.
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Proof of Lemma 3: By assumption, there exits a P -feasible conguration of messages
(mL;mR) forming (; ). Therefore, it must be that
jl+1 =
4 [c(i)  c(j)]
il + 
j
l+1
+ 4b+ il
for l 2 f1; :::; h  1g [ fh+ 2; :::; n  1g in addition to:
jh+1 =
4 [c(i)  c(j)]
ih 1 + 
j
h+1
+ 4b+ ih+1:
Now nd the cheapest message inM which has not been used by either mL or mR, say my.
First, we check whether (mL;m
y
h;mR) is P -feasible. In order to check this, it must be the
case that
jl+1 =
4 [c(i)  c(j)]
il + 
j
l+1
+ 4b+ il
for l 2 f1; :::; n   1g such that yh. If (mL;myh;mR) is not P -feasible then (mL;mR) is the
maximal, P -feasible conguration. If (mL;m
y
h;mR) is P -feasible then we will nd, among
the available messages not used by either mL or mR, the next most complex message, say mz.
Now we check whether (mL;mzh;mR) is P -feasible. In order to check this, it must be the case
that
jl+1 =
4 [c(i)  c(j)]
il + 
j
l+1
+ 4b+ il
for l 2 f1; :::; n  1g such that zh. If (mL;mzh;mR) is not P -feasible then (mL;myh;mR) is the
maximal, P -feasible conguration. If (mL;mzh;mR) is P -feasible then we will nd, among the
available messages not used by either mL or mR, the next most complex message. We repeat
this procedure until we have found an available mk
0
such that (mL;mk
0
h ;mR) is not P -feasible.
We are guaranteed such a k0 because when increasing the complexity of the hth message,
it must be that:
jl+1 =
4 [c(i)  c(j)]
il + 
j
l+1
+ 4b+ il
for l 2 f1; :::; n 1g. As the complexity of the message is increased, jh must decrease. To see
this note that [c(i)  c(j)] decreases due to the assumption that c(j) c(j 1)   > 0 for all j.
For large enough j the term [c(i)  c(j)] becomes negative. Additionally, the term ih 1+jh is
bounded by 1. Hence, there must be a k0 such that (mL;mk
0
h ;mR) is not feasible. Therefore,
there exists a there exists a maximal, P -feasible conguration (mL;mkh;mR) forming equilibria
(; ).
Proof of Proposition 1: Suppose that (; ) is P -feasible. Given , there does
not exist a protable deviation from  regarding the messages used in equilibrium since it
satises expression (4). There does not exist a protable deviation for S by sending an out-
of-equilibrium message since there are no new actions induced by such a message. Given
 which satises Lemma 1 there is no protable deviation for R from  since it satises
expression (1). Therefore, (; ) is an equilibrium.
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Lemma 10 If b = 0 and there are n actions induced then there are n + 1 solutions to
maxs(a(m
0)  s0)2 + c(m0).
Proof: Suppose that US(a; bm; s) > US(a; bm; s) where ([s; s)) = bm. As the distribution
is uniform, a = s+s2 . This implies that

s+s
2   s
2
>

s+s
2   s
2
, which cannot be the case.
Combined with expression (2), we have n+ 1 such solutions.
Hence, if b = 0 and there are n actions induced there are n + 1 states with the worst
ex-post payo¤. Naturally these are candidates for reasonable beliefs in the event of an out-
of-equilibrium message. Further, any of these n+ 1 states would be su¢ cient for the results
under Condition L to hold.
Proof Proposition 2: First we show that an equilibrium under Condition L always
exists. As Lemma 5 shows, there will always be a maximal, L-feasible (; ). Suppose that
expression (6) is satised for k. We need to check that it is not protable for the sender such
that s = 0, to transmit message a message of complexity k+1. Because k satises expression
(6) it must be that 0 =
q
4c(k) +
 
k
2
. By Lemma 10, the equilibrium payo¤s for the S
who received signal s = 0 is:
 

0
2
  0
2
  c(0) =  

1
2
  0
2
  c(1) = ::: =  
 
k
2
  0
!2
  c(k).
All of the messages used in equilibrium will not provide a protable deviation, therefore we
must use an out-of-equilibrium message to nd a deviation. Any deviation accomplished by
message of complexity k+x where x > 1 can be accomplished with a lower communication cost
by sending message of complexity k+1. Therefore, the cheapest (and therefore best candidate)
out-of-equilibruim message is the message with complexity k + 1. If such a message is sent,
R would have beliefs that the message was sent by state s = 0. Sending this signal yields a
payo¤ of  c(k+ 1). Therefore, the signal will be protable when  k2 > 4 [c(k + 1)  c(k)].
For the case that k+1 = 0 it must also be that k = 4 [c(k + 1)  c(k)]. However, when
k + 1 is not L-feasible it must be that
 
k
2
< 4c(k) and there is no protable deviation.
Therefore, when k is L feasible and k + 1 is not, there is no protable deviation to an
equilibrium with a signal more complex than k and so a k-equilibrium always exists.
Now we will show that if k is L-feasible then there does not exist an equilibrium in which
the most complex signal is k0 where k0 < k. Suppose that k is L-feasible and k + 1 is not.
Consider a candidate k0-equilibrium. This candidate equilibrium is characterized by:bj2   bi2 = 4(c(i)  c(j)) for i; j 2 f1; ::; k0g
bk0 > 0b0 + b1 + :::+ bk0 = 1
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When k = 0, a k-equilibrium would require expression (3) to hold where k = 0 and k
0
=
4 [c(k)  c(k0)]. When k > 0 it must be that
k
02
= 4

c(k)  c(k0)+ k2 > 4 c(k)  c(k0) .
Therefore, it must be that
bk02 > 4 [c(k)  c(k0)] and that b02 > 4c(k). So we can
write the equilibrium payo¤s as:
US =  
0B@
b02
2
  0
1CA
2
<  c(k)
Deviation payo¤s are  c(k), therefore equilibrium payo¤s are less than deviation payo¤s and
so a k0-equilibrium cannot exist.
To see that each k-equilibria uniquely determines the values of , we can rewrite expression
(3) as:
2
q
c(z) +
 
k
2
+ 2
q
c(z)  c(1) +  k2 + 22qc(z)  c(2) +  k2 + ::: (8)
+2z 1
q
c(z)  c(z   2) +  k2 + 2zqc(z)  c(z   1) +  k2 + k = 1
The left hand side of expression (8) is strictly increasing in k and therefore must only hold
for a single value of k. And so the proposition is proved.
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